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Abstract
Industrial control organizations need to perform IT security preparedness
exercises more frequently than today. However, limited support material
currently exists. This paper presents a board game, Play2Prepare, which
simulates a large scale attack on the electric power grid. The game consists
of a number of scenarios and questions that are meant to trigger discussions
and knowledge exchange. The intention with this board game is to support
organizations in strengthening their incident response capabilities. Initial
feedback from the electric power industry indicates that this board game is
indeed a relevant tool for preparedness exercises for IT security incidents.
1 Introduction
Organizations must be prepared to respond to unexpected information security threats and
incidents, and this requires training. Well documented procedures and clear definitions of
roles and responsibilities are among the basic structures that need to be in place, but
when an incident occurs, there is usually no time to study documentation; the involved
personnel needs to be well trained and able to make the right decisions under pressure.
Current threat reports state that targeted attacks are on the rise [1] and industrial
control organizations, such as oil and energy companies, appear to be attractive targets [8].
One type of industrial control organizations is Distribution System Operators (DSOs) in
the electric power industry. DSOs own and manage the distribution grid, which is the
low-voltage part of the power grid. Their customers range from private households to all
kinds of businesses and industries, including critical services to society, such as hospitals
and transportation. They are currently facing the evolution of smart grids, which will
lead to a major increase in connectivity and technological, operational, and procedural
changes. This implies a need for collaboration between industrial control staff and IT
staff in responding to new information security threats that will arise [10]. Being prepared
to handle these threats is of utmost importance in order to succeed with smart grids.
DSOs must therefore respond effectively and efficiently to security incidents in order to
protect themselves, their customers and society at large. Training for information security
incident response is, however, not frequently performed by DSOs [13].
Our research aims to aid DSOs in performing preparedness exercises for IT security
incidents. In this paper we present a board game, Play2Prepare, to be used as a tool in
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preparedness exercises for IT security incidents. The goal with this game is to improve
the DSO’s incident response capabilities by enabling discussions and reflections and
increasing awareness among the participants.
2 Background
An exercise is a simulation of an emergency designed to validate the viability of one or
more aspects of an IT plan [5]. Most preparedness exercises can be classified as either
table-top exercises or functional exercises. Table-top exercises are discussion-based, and
are well suited for getting familiarized with existing plans and procedures, communication
structures and responsibilities in a organization. Such exercises are typically performed
with all participants gathered around a table. Functional exercises, on the other hand,
might include computer systems or other physical artefacts, as well as practical tasks.
The importance of training is widely acknowledged and guidelines exist on how to
perform preparedness exercises [5]. Still, the literature on preparedness exercises for
information security incident management is limited [16]. Two recent studies [12, 13]
showed that training for information security incidents is seldom performed by the DSOs.
Games, such as card games and board games, typically support discussion-based
exercises by simulating incidents and offering a number of “what if” situations. A
number of games exist that concern information security awareness, threats, and incidents:
Ctrl-Alt-Hack [2] was designed for increasing general computer security awareness.
[d0x3d!] [3] simulates an attack against a computer network, and the participants
cooperate in fighting this attack. The goal of The Disaster Game [14] is to develop
quite detailed scenarios for emergency situations and hence challenge the participants in
resolving these scenarios. Pandemic [17] is a board game that simulates that different
types of diseases infect different parts of the world. In addition there are a number
of digitalized IT security games, such as Secure Empire [15] and “Cybersecure: Your
Medical Practice” [6]. Even though all these games are about threat, incident and/or
disaster management, none of them support exercises where industrial control staff and
IT staff are challenged to cooperate on information security incident management.
3 Play2Prepare: The Design
To fill the gap identified in the previous section we decided to design a prepardness
exercise that is adapted to DSOs that need to practice on how they handle IT security
incidents. Our main goals with the exercise were to:
1. Increase awareness. We wanted to provide the DSOs with an innovative approach
to perform IT security exercises, which will help them increase their awareness and
raise their competence regarding relevant IT security threats to the control systems.
2. Enable discussions. The exercise should include all parties that are involved in
resolving an IT security incident, and the process should allow them to discuss
relevant threats and to exchange knowledge and experience with each other.
3. Improve the DSO’s incident response capabilities. The exercise should allow any
shortcomings and/or grey areas in the organizations’ current plans and procedures
to be identified during the discussions.
To reach these three goals we decided to design a table-top exercise rather than a
hands-on exercise. A hands-on exercise typically includes tampering with, and restoring,
systems, and usually has a high degree of learning outcome. However, using control
systems in a hands-on exercise is impractical due to the nature of the operations they
control, which demands availability and fully functioning systems at all times. The largest
DSOs might have complete test systems, but we would not expect the smaller DSOs to
have this. A table-top exercise is much easier to perform when it comes to resources.
The main cost is the time spent by the participating personnel. Furthermore, a table-top
exercise is easier to get started with since it requires very little preparations.
The table-top exercise that we created is designed as a classical board game, which we
extended with domain specific technical content in terms of scenarios. In an information
security context, scenarios are commonly used to increase organizations’ knowledge
on threats and risks. They are also often utilized in information security preparedness
exercises [5]. To be useful the scenarios need to be adapted to fit the particular exercise
where they will be used. The scenarios that are presented in this section have been
designed to reflect real problems that DSOs may face and they have been customized
to fit in a board game context. In addition to the scenarios, which are meant to create
discussions amongst the participants during the game, we have also created a number of
questions and “did you know” facts. The intention of these is to mix up the discussions
with less comprehensive tasks. The questions also make it possible to reward correct
answers in the game; something that can be used to motivate the participants.
An important criteria for creating a good exercise is that the participants consider it to
be realistic [7]. A realistic exercise therefore needs to be based on scenarios that do not
contain logical shortcomings and that appear to be credible from the participants point of
view. In this work we have tried to ensure scenarios that are both realistic and broadly
applicable by avoiding the inclusion of too many technical details about the system;
instead the focus is on the attacks and their possible consequences. The scenarios that
we have design are based on related work (cf. Section 2) and known vulnerabilities in
existing control systems. Furthermore we have ensured the quality of the scenarios by
asking stakeholders from DSOs to validate and to provide feedback on the scenarios. Our
intention has been to create scenarios that cover threats, vulnerabilities and the impacts of
security incidents, as well as the division of responsibility and roles in DSOs.
The Scenarios
The purpose of the scenarios in the board game is to make the participants reflect around
a particular situation that may occur. Some of these scenarios describe the organization’s
point of view (when they work to solve an attack), while others try to make the participants
understand the motivations behind an attack. A study by Line and Moe [11] shows that
a multi-phase scenario description will help the participants to understand correlations
over time and to detect attacks that would otherwise have remained undetected. All the
scenarios are therefore created in a multi-phase shape with accompanying questions.
Scenario 1: Smart meters. A customer who has tampered with the radio signals from
his smart meter, manages to modify the readings of the meter in order to lower his reported
consumption of power.
• How can a small scale attack like this be detected?
• What are the consequences of this attack and how can they be mitigated?
The smart metering system in the area where the customer lives, suddenly reports on a
large discrepancy between the collected readings from the customers and the reported
amount of power that has been transformed through the corresponding substation.
Apparently, the customer has bragged about his trick to some of his neighbours.
• How does the situation change now that the discrepancy increases?
• What could be the worst-case scenario in this situation?
Scenario 2: Social manipulation and insider threats. During a day with harsh
weather leading to an unstable power network there is suddenly a breakdown in the
central power network between the cities Nes and Aurland. You initially assume that
the breakdown was caused by the weather, however, after a number of repeated similar
breakdowns you start suspecting there is another reason; the system might be under attack.
• Mention a few reasons why you would suspect a malicious intent behind these
breakdowns? (How do you find out what has caused a power outage?)
• Assuming that you are the person who first suspect the breakdowns are caused by
malicious activity; how would you proceed? Who should be contacted and what
procedures should be followed?
Eventually, it turns out that the breakdown was due to sabotage against a back-up system.
The attackers had gained access by using information from the organization’s public
webpage, Facebook and LinkedIn to find out who were employed in what positions.
This information was then cross-checked with credit card payment remarks to find a
“victim” who was in need of money. The “victim” was offered a cash reward to introduce
a backdoor into the system.
• How can such events be prevented?
• Could this have happened in your organization? Why / why not?
Scenario 3: A zero-day attack. Assume that you are working at the regional center.
Suddenly the control system alerts about a number of errors in the power grid. After
some investigation you realize that there are no real errors; all the alerts are false alarms.
• What could be the reason for all the false alarms?
• What would indicate that the false alarms are due to attacks?
• What procedures are to be followed in this case?
This turns out to be an attack that exploits an unpatched vulnerability (a zero-day attack)
in the control system and the Incident Response Team (IRT) is called for. A check of
the sub systems reveals that the firmware in the PLCs1 in the key sensor units has been
overwritten, which leads to erroneous control and switching data. This implies that the
data from the control system cannot be trusted.
• How serious are the consequences of this incident? When will it be necessary to
switch to manual supervision of the power grid?
Shortly thereafter you are notified about a massive denial-of-service attack that is blocking
the network between the system operation, the manager and the IRT team. This makes it
difficult to use your IT systems to coordinate the response to this incident
• How can you ensure a smooth communication during this incident?
Scenario 4: Privacy and smart meters. Accidently, a port in the firewall has been
left open, which allows direct access from external networks. The vulnerability has been
exploited by attackers, who manage to access the smart meter database where all customer
data are stored; including their registered power consumption.
• What could be the intention behind this attack?
• How can this attack be detected?
• What measures can be introduced to prevent this attack from happening?
1PLC: Programmable Logic Controller
• How likely is it that you would be fooled in each of the three situations?
• Identify the situation where you believe most of the employees in your HR
department would be fooled and discuss what the consequences could be.
Scenario 5: Threats and the media. NSM2 has received a tip-off that their security
experts consider to be trustworthy. A group of hackers claim to have gained access to the
control system and threaten to black-out one of the largest cities in Norway.
• Who is responsible for what in this situation (KraftCERT3, NSM, public authorities,
your own organization)?
• What actions must be taken to confirm that this is a real threat?
After some investigation, you are still unsure whether this is a real threat.
• How will the situation be handled?
• State some elements of an action plan.
Shortly thereafter, the media get wind of the situation and you experience a storm of
enquiries from both journalists and your customers.
• What immediate actions should be taken in this situation?
• Identify some critical information and explain how this should be communicated to
the customer support and to the media.
The Questions and “Did You Know” Facts
The questions in the game are designed to create discussions amongst the participants
and to increase their understanding of important concepts related to information security.
Some examples of questions related to security are: In an information security context,
what is meant by “confidentiality”? and What is the difference between IT security and
supply security?. Other questions are related to internal procedures that are to be followed
in case of an incident, for example How can you make sure that someone making a phone
call to customer support is the person he states to be? and Mention one situation where
the procedure is to shut down the remote access to the control system?.
The “did you know” facts are less comprehensive than the questions and consist of
short inputs that aim to create dynamics and variation in the game. They will be read out
loud by the participants and they are intended to be thought-provoking. Some examples
are USB thumb drives loaded with malware that are “accidentally” left behind can be
picked up by employees who start to use them. Did you know that the worst attack
against SCADA systems, Stuxnet, started this way? and In 2014 the most commonly used
password was “123456” closely followed by “password”.
The scenarios, the questions and the “did you know” facts represent the technical
foundation of the table-top exercise and are meant to add a domain specific information
security flavour to the game.
4 Playing the Game
Play2Prepare is a cooperative board game where the players will work together to mitigate
attacks against the power grid network. The players let their pawns travel around the
board in order to neutralize local attacks, while the attack spreads in each round. The
game is designed for 3-4 players, where each player is assigned a particular role with
accompanying skills that have to be utilized in the best possible manner in order to win
2The Norwegian National Security Authority. https://www.nsm.stat.no/
3The cyber security IRT for the power industry in Norway. http://www.kraftcert.no/
the game. Play2Prepare has a similar logic functionality as the existing board game
Pandemic [17] but has been heavily adapted to integrate information security management
procedures into the context of DSOs. Fig. 1 displays the content of the game. 4
(a) 6 pawns og 5 Miti-
gate markers
(b) 30 Attack cubes og
5 Research Stations
(c) 6 Role cards (d) 6 Attack!! cards
(e) The board (f) 38 Attack Propaga-
tion cards
(g) 38 Player cards
with city and phase
(h) Scenario, Question
and “Did You Know”
cards.
Figure 1: The content of the game (note that the cards are printed in Norwegian)
Setting up the Game
The game is set up as follows:
1. Place the board in the center of the table within easy reach of all the players. Place
six Research Stations, three Mitigate markers and all the Attack cubes near the side
of the board. Put one of the Research Stations at the Frogner city on the board.
2. Put the Attack Rate Marker on the first space of the Attack Rate Track (Norw.:
Angrepsrate) and the Breakdown Marker on the “0” space of the Breakdowns
Indicator (Norw.: Sammenbrudd).
3. Draw 3 Attack Propagation cards and put 3 Attack cubes on each of the
corresponding cities. Draw 3 more cards and do the same thing as above, but add 2
cubes to each city. Finally, draw 3 cards and do the same as above, but add 1 cube
to each city. Put the used Attack Propagation cards facing up aside the pile of cards.
4Due to space limitation we can only give a brief introduction to the game is this paper. More thorough
instructions, as well as a sample turn of the game that shows the situation and explains the possible actions
after several turns have passed, can be found in the report [4].
4. Let the players choose 1 Role card each. Shuffle the Player cards and deal them to
the players face down: 3 player game - 3 cards each, 4 player game - 2 cards each.
5. Shuffle 4-6 Attack!! cards (depending on how difficult you want to make the game)
into the pile of remaining Player cards. Shuffle a number of Scenario, Questions
and “Did You Know” cards into the pile. Put the pile of cards onto the board.
6. Put all the pawns at the Hamang city on the board. The player who most recently
shifted his/her password will start the game.
The prepared board game (printed in Norwegian) is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Figure 2: The board game, prepared to be played.
Actions in the Game
The play proceeds clockwise around the table with each player taking turns in order until
the game ends. Each turn, the current player must 1) Take (at most) 4 actions, 2) Draw 2
Player cards to add to his hand, and 3) Draw 1 Attack!! card. The different actions that
the player can choose between are:
• Drive: the player moves his pawn to an adjacent city.
• Fly: the player can 1) dismiss a card to travel to the city printed at the card, or 2)
dismiss a card that has the pawn’s current city printed and travel to any city, or 3)
travel from a city with a Research Station to any other city with a Research Station.
• Build a Research Station: the player can dismiss a card that has the pawn’s current
city printed in order to build a Research Station in that city.
• Restore the system: Remove a cube from the city where the pawn is located.
• Mitigate an attack: Dismiss 5 cards that represents each of the five phases in the
incident management process.
• Share knowledge. When two pawns are located in the same city, their players can
exchange cards printed with that city.
A given action may be performed more than once during a turn, as long as 1 action is spent
for each instance. Each player’s Role will grant them special abilities that are unique to
that player. Players may also pass if they have nothing else to do. Unused actions may
not be saved from turn to turn.
(a) A breakdown in Tonstad
(b) The breakdown in Ton-
stad leads to another break-
down in Lyse
(c) The situation after the
chain reaction has passed
Figure 3: An example of a breakdown causing a chain reaction in the network.
Description of the Game
In the current version of Play2Prepare the board represents part of the central power
distribution network in Norway. The target of the current version of the game is
therefore employees at Statnett, which is the organization that manages the central power
distribution network in Norway. However, the board can easily be adapted to other
organizations by replacing or changing parts of the network. The attack rate is initially
set to 2, which means that 2 cards will be drawn in each round. The attack rate will
increase every time an Attack!! card has been drawn. An attack will be mitigated when
a player manages to collect 5 Player cards with different numbers (representing the five
phases in the ISO/IEC 27035 information security incident management standard5) and
deliver these to a Research Station. For each attack that is mitigated, 1/3, 2/3 and 3/3 (i.e.
all) of the cubes on the board will be removed. The players will agree on which cubes they
want to remove. The Breakdown marker starts at “0” and will increase every time there
is a breakdown somewhere in the network. A breakdown occurs if a player is required to
add a cube to a city that already has 3 cubes in it. When this happens, instead of adding a
4th cube, add a cube to each adjacent city. If any of these new cubes would cause the total
number of cubes of that colour in an adjacent city to exceed 3, additional breakdowns
may occur, causing a chain reaction. Note that each city may only breakdown once in
each chain reaction.
Fig. 3 shows what happens when an Attack!! card with the city Tonstad is drawn when
this city already has 3 cubes. Then the cities Stølaheia, Kristiansand, Fjotland and Lyse
will each receive an additional cube. Since Lyse already has 3 cubes, a breakdown will
happen in this city as well. The attack will therefore spread to Sauda, Duge and Stølaheia.
The Cards
There are seven different types of cards in the game. The Attack Propagation cards
show which cities an attack spreads to. For each card that is drawn, add 1 cube to the
5The five phases in ISO/IEC 27035 are: 1) Plan and prepare, 2) Detection and reporting, 3) Assessment
and Decision, 4) Responses, and 5) Evaluation and lessons learnt. Note that even though the plan and
prepare phase is not directly part of the process of responding to an actual incident we have chosen to
include all five phases in the game to create a complete mapping to the standard.
Table 1: The roles that have been defined for the current version of Play2Prepare.
Role Skill
CEO Can draw a random card and give it to another player whose pawn is in the
same city as the CEO’s own pawn.
IT security expert Needs only 4 of the 5 phases in the ISO/IEC 27035 standard to mitigate an
attack.
Public authority By dismissing an arbitrary Player card, this role can 1) build a new Research
Station in the city where his pawn is located, or 2) fly from a city with a
Research Station to any other city.
Network operator Can dismiss all cubes in 1 city with only 1 action.
IRT team leader Can move other players’ pawns (with their permission) as if they were his own.
Control system oper-
ator
Can prevent that new cubes (i.e. attacks) are placed (i.e. occur) in the city, or
in any nearby cities, where his pawn is located.
city printed on the card. The Player cards are associated with one city and one of the
incident management phases defined in ISO/IEC 27035 standard [9]. The Player cards
have two functionalities. Either they can be used to perform an action, for example flying
to the city associated with the card, or they can be collected in order to mitigate attacks.
A player can mitigate an attack if he has collected 5 Player cards that cover all the 5
different phases in the standard. The Scenario, Question and “Did You Know” cards
have technical contents as described in the previous section. A number of these cards
will be shuffled into the pile of Player cards (the actual number depends on how much
technical discussion one wants to include in the game). The Attack!! cards describe
what actions shall be taken when an attack happens. The possible actions are: 1) Increase
the attack rate: Move the Attack Rate Indicator up by one on the Attack Rate Track on the
Board. 2) Distribute the attack: Take the bottom card from the Attack! draw pile and add
3 cubes to the city pictured on the card. Note that no city can contain more than 3 cubes.
If the attack would cause the city to exceed that limit, any excess cubes are returned to
the stock and an breakdown is triggered. 3) Intensify the attack: Shuffle the used Attack!
cards and place them on top of the remaining Attack! cards pile. Finally, all players have
been assigned a role in the game. Each role has a special skill described on the Role card.
An important aspect of the game is to cooperate in order to use the skills associated with
the roles in the best possible way. The roles that have been defined for the current version
of Play2Prepare are displayed in Table 1. Note that it is of course possible to replace the
name of the roles with other terms that better fit the structure of the organization(s) that
are involved in the exercise, however, to ensure a good flow in the game the skills should
remain the same.
Game End
Players collectively win the game immediately when 3 attacks have been mitigated. The
game ends immediately in defeat for all players if any of the following conditions occur:
• The attack has spread too much: there are more than 30 cubes on the board.
• The sixth breakdown occurs (the Breakdown Marker reaches the skull symbol on
the Breakdown Indicator)
• There are not enough cards in the Player card pile when a player must draw cards
The game takes approximately 1-2 hours to play.
5 Evaluation
Play2Prepare has been evaluated in three rounds during its development.
Functional Testing Without the Scenarios
In the first round the functionality of the game was tested. The main goal of this test was
to identify potential improvements and to adjust the basic functionality of the game. The
test was performed in two phases; an initial pre-test where the first author of this paper
took the role of three different players and played the game herself in order to identify
obvious shortcomings and make quick improvements, and a second phase where three
volunteers (without any specific knowledge about information security or the power grid
network) played the game. The scenarios were not included in the first round of the test.
The first round of the test resulted in a number of functional improvements, such as
adjusting the number of cities and corresponding connections on the map of the board, the
criteria for winning and losing the game the number of players in the game, the expected
time to complete the game and the division of responsibilities amongst the participants.
Functional Testing Including the Scenarios
In the second round the main goal was to evaluate the feasibility of the complete exercise.
The participants in this test were three university students who specializes in information
security. They played the game from start to end and provided feedback on a number of
different aspects, as discussed beneath.
• The pile of Player cards.. The game was set up with 2 Scenario, 3 Question and 3
“Did You Know” cards mixed into the pile of Player cards, which thereby consisted
of 38 Player cards with city and phase, 8 cards with technical content and 4 Attack!!
cards (in total 50 cards). This ratio of different types of cards turned out to be a good
choice and had no obvious negative influence on the feasibility of the game.
• The Scenario, Question and “Did You Know” cards. The test revealed some
obscurities in the initial wording in these cards (that have now been reformulated).
• Timing. Using the proposed set-up with 4 Attack!! cards, the test was completed in
35 minutes (the test group won the game), which is considered relatively fast. Based
on how many cards that were left in the pile of Player cards we estimate the time
to complete the exercise to be approximately 60 minutes in ordinary cases (when
the participants may not be as lucky). Adding time for introducing the exercise and
preparing the board we estimate the time for completing the game to at most 1.5
hour.
• Flow of the game. Finally we wanted to investigate how the introduction of the
technical part (i.e. the scenarios, questions and “did you know” facts) influence
the flow of the game. The technical part currently runs somewhat in parallel to the
game, since the scenarios currently do not affect the actions of the board. Due to the
participants’ background (they were all university students with limited knowledge
of how DSOs operate) we did not manage to fully test this aspect. However, our
test indicated that splitting up the discussions of the different phases in a scenario
may be problematic since the incident that is being discussed needs to be fresh in
the participants’ memories.
During the debriefing of the test, several of the participants mentioned that, even though
the game appeared to be complicated when it was introduced, it turned out to be easy to
grasp once they had started to play.
Feedback from the Power Industry
In the third round Play2Prepare was presented to three stakeholders from the Norwegian
electric power industry; one employee at Statnett6 and two employees at NVE7, who
are actively involved in preparedness activities in their respective organizations. They
provided feedback on the technical content of the game and on the exercise as a whole.
Regarding the idea of using a board game for preparedness exercise, the stakeholders
considered this to be a fun and informal way of learning and that it is efficient, since
the necessary preparations will be kept minimal. They believed that such an exercise
can contribute in increasing the ability to cooperate and share knowledge amongst their
employees; in particular between the IT staff and the industrial control systems staff.
They pointed out that discussions across different departments within an organization
are always useful and that there is always a need for more training to increase their IT
security preparedness. They also pointed out that the rules of the game should not be too
complicated, in order to lower the threshold for start utilizing the game.
Regarding the technical content, the stakeholders suggested that some of the roles
that have been pre-defined in the game needed to be changed to better fit their respective
organizational structure. Also, all scenarios will not be relevant for all organizations.
The final round of the evaluation also resulted in a number of editorial changes to the
text in the description of the scenarios, the questions and the “did you know” facts.
6 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
We have presented Play2Prepare, a board game intended to support teams in industrial
control organizations performing preparedness exercises for IT security incidents. The
game facilitates knowledge exchange and awareness raising through a set of scenarios to
be discussed, a number of questions to be answered and a number of “did you know”
facts. Even though our evaluation was brief, it indicates that this type of exercise might
indeed be useful for DSOs, as part of their preparedness exercises.
The feedback from the participants in the evaluations indicated that it takes some time
to understand the rules of the game and to set up the board the first time the game is to
be played. If the game is to be used in a preparedness exercise program, someone with
experience with the board game should support the team playing the game by acting as a
facilitator. This would increase the efficiency of the exercise, ensuring that the participants
do not spend unnecessary time on learning the game dynamics.
Recalling the goals that were stated in Section 3, we aimed to create a table-top
exercise that 1) increases awareness, 2) enables discussions, and 3) improves the DSOs’
incident response capabilities. Our evaluation indicates that we have achieved the first two
goals, however, to what degree Play2Prepare will be useful as a part of the organizations’
preparedness exercise progress remains to be seen. Our next step will therefore be to
perform thorough evaluations in industrial control organizations with relevant personnel
participating. Further, the effect of this board game compared to a traditional table top
exercise should be evaluated. We are also considering re-designing and implementing
Play2Prepare into a digital version, which would better support an exercise for distributed
teams where the team members are located at different geographical locations.
In addition there are functional changes that could be implemented in order to improve
the gaming experience. As mentioned in Section 5, the technical content of the game, (i.e.
6http://www.statnett.no
7NVE: The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, http://www.nve.no
the scenarios, questions and “did you know” facts) currently do not influence the state on
the board (i.e. the spread of the attack). In a new version of the game, the correct answers
to e.g. the questions could be used to gain advantages in the game.
The current version of Play2Prepare has been designed for Norwegian DSOs. To be
useful as a preparedness exercise in other countries, and in other types of organizations,
both the network graph printed at the board, the language used, and the content of the
scenarios must be adapted in order to fit the new context. Finally, if the game is to be
played repeatedly during a number of subsequent exercises, the number of scenarios must
be increased in order to make sure that each round brings up fresh topics to discuss.
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